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INTRODUCTION 
It is a pleasure to be here; thanks to the Michigan State University 
Journal of International Law for the opportunity. It is timely for me to 
participate in this Symposium panel on “The Effects of Human Rights 
Norms on Sovereignty,” since my book, Radicals in Their Own Time: Four 
Hundred Years of Struggle for Liberty and Equal Justice, was just published 
by Cambridge University Press.1 Radicals looks at the lives of five 
individuals who exemplify 400 years of struggle for liberty and equal justice 
in America. These five individuals led the way in the struggle for human 
rights in America—for what is human rights if not liberty and equal justice, 
and individual autonomy and free will?  
I. RADICALS IN THEIR OWN TIME 
The genesis for the book is epitomized by its epigraph, which quotes 
Albert Einstein in 1953: “In teaching history there should be extensive 
discussions of personalities who benefitted mankind through independence 
of character and judgment.” It was in this spirit that I undertook the 
project—that is, I wanted to look at some of the personalities throughout 
American history who did benefit mankind through their independence of 
character and judgment. 
Reading from Radicals:  
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In the spirit of Einstein’s words in the epigraph, Radicals in Their Own 
Time discusses the personalities of five Americans who led the way in 
bursting some of America’s most inglorious chains of injustice and 
oppression. Progress toward greater freedom in America has never been 
direct or easy. Democracy is messy, and the nation has had its share of 
despotic leaders and oppressive majorities.  
But one constant throughout American history has been the recurring 
theme of individuals of superior character and judgment, who have 
courageously stood up to lead the fight for human rights, that is, freedom 
and justice, despite considerable hardships to themselves. Every 
generation has them, men and women who speak the truth to power, in the 
face of sometimes overwhelming official and unofficial resistance. People 
who rebel against stifling orthodoxy and demand governmental tolerance 
and equal treatment, even when it seems they alone are waging the fight. 
Individuals who crave freedom from arbitrary authority like the very air 
they breathe. 
The five individuals the book looks at are, first, Roger Williams (for the 
proposition of religious freedom of conscience), who lived from 1603 to 
1682. Williams, who founded the colony of Rhode Island and 
Providencetown, was ostracized and eventually banished from the Puritan 
communities of Massachusetts Bay Colony for his troublesome views on 
religious freedom.  
It looks next at Thomas Paine (for the proposition of the natural “Rights 
of Man”), who lived from 1737 to 1809. Thomas Paine, of course, was the 
author of Common Sense, the bombshell pamphlet that predated by five 
months (and in part motivated) the Declaration of Independence and other 
massive works like The Rights of Man (which was instrumental in the 
French Revolution) and The Age of Reason. 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton (for the proposition of women’s rights), who 
lived during the nineteenth century from 1815 until 1902, is the next 
subject. Stanton was a fearless advocate for women’s rights who wasn’t 
content to settle for just the right to vote. She certainly did demand the vote 
and was the first to do so in the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 in the 
Declaration of Rights and Sentiments that she and her colleagues put forth, 
but she wasn’t willing to settle for the vote alone; rather, she demanded 
equality in all respects, long before that was a recognized and acceptable 
position to take.  
Next is W.E.B. Du Bois (for the proposition of black rights), who lived 
from 1868 to 1963. Du Bois was a fearless advocate for African-American 
rights throughout the many decades of the late 19th century and the first half 
of the 20th century, consistently poking and prodding a mainstream culture 
that largely denigrated and dehumanized people of color.  
And then, finally, the book profiles Vine Deloria Jr. (for the proposition 
of Native American rights and traditions), who is the character that I’d like 
to focus on today. Deloria was the intellectual voice for generations of 
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Native Americans past, present and future in calling the United States and 
state governments to task for their failures regarding Indian rights. Deloria 
burst on the scene in 1969 with his book, Custer Died for Your Sins, and 
many other publications in the following decades, until his death in 2005. 
One of the things that all of these characters argued for, and the crucial 
point they made, was that every government must recognize, or must 
tolerate, individual liberty, equal justice, and human rights. That is worth 
saying again: Government must tolerate. And so it becomes a matter of the 
government not interfering with individual free will, which thereby allows 
diverse viewpoints and practices the necessary breathing space that they 
require in a free, pluralistic society. Radicals explains: 
Roger Williams believed government should stay separate from, that it 
should tolerate, all religious practices. Paine was committed to the 
common-sense principle that government must not abridge, that it must 
tolerate the individual rights of all people. Stanton demanded that 
government replace a legal regime imposing separate, inferior status on 
women with one that recognizes, that tolerates, the equal legal status of 
women. Du Bois tirelessly challenged government to repudiate laws and 
practices that institutionalized white supremacist principles, and thereby to 
accept, to tolerate black people as equals under the law. And Deloria spent 
his lifetime exposing the practices of the U.S. government that 
systematically reneged on its solemn promises to leave alone, or tolerate, 
Indian tribes with their native lands and traditions, and pointed the way 
forward for how that government should make amends for its egregious 
breaches of faith. 
II. VINE DELORIA JR. AND INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 
My take on this panel—the effects of human rights norms on 
sovereignty—is the Native American context, because Native American 
communities are sovereign. They were here first. These sovereign rights, 
however, have not been adequately recognized or respected over time by the 
United States government.  
As noted above, Vine Deloria Jr. has been instrumental in discussing, 
among many other things, the topic of Indian sovereignty. Like the other 
four individuals profiled in Radicals in Their Own Time, Deloria detested 
oppressive authority, and he spoke up passionately for broad governmental 
recognition and tolerance of Indian sovereignty, self-determination, and 
traditions. He demanded, “what we [Indians] need is a cultural leave-us-
alone agreement, in spirit and in fact.”  
Deloria sought to educate people that, under the terms of their 
historically unique political arrangement with the United States, Indian 
states are entirely separate (albeit dependent) sovereigns. As such they are 
entitled, under well-established principles of international law, to the respect 
given any other sovereign state. Early on, the U.S. Supreme Court (if not the 
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President and Congress) recognized these principles. Chief Justice John 
Marshall said in Worcester v. Georgia in the early 1830s: 
The settled doctrine of the law of nations is that a weaker power does not 
surrender its independence—its right to self-government—by associating 
with a stronger, and taking its protection . . . . A weak state, in order to 
provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more 
powerful without stripping itself of the right of government and ceasing to 
be a state.  
Marshall continued, quoting the Swiss scholar Emmerich de Vattel, perhaps 
the leading international law scholar of the day: “Tributary and feudatory 
states do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states.” In short, 
Deloria explains, the dominant society is duty-bound to leave the tribes 
alone to exercise their sovereign rights of government.  
Moreover, Deloria adds, “Indians stand apart (not more or less favored—
just apart) from other minority groups in America.” When a federal or state 
court, as opposed to a tribal court, asserts jurisdiction over people, whether 
Indian or non-Indian, on reservation land, for example, Deloria and other 
Indian law experts view the issue as involving tribal political rights as 
opposed to civil rights or racial justice. David Getches writes, for example, 
“The larger issue at stake in nearly all Indian law cases is the relationship of 
the tribe to the United States, a matter rooted in centuries-old policy created 
as part of the nation’s constitutional framework.” 
Despite the self-serving Discovery Doctrine rationale regarding property 
rights in the earlier Johnson v. MacIntosh case (familiar to all first-year 
Property students), John Marshall and the early Supreme Court in Worcester 
v. Georgia and other cases nonetheless still did believe that broad-based 
tribal sovereignty was mandated under the nation’s constitutional structure. 
In Worcester, Marshall emphatically announced that Indian communities 
are “distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries within 
which their authority is exclusive . . . . Because the Constitution exclusively 
reserves the power to interact with sovereign tribes to the federal 
government, it follows that it is entirely inappropriate for states to engage in 
Indian affairs.” Marshall explained that international law principles apply to 
the United States’ tribal relations because Indian tribes are sovereign 
nations that existed before the founding of the United States. And because 
they did not participate in the framing of the Constitution, they are outside 
the Constitution’s scope. As with any other nation, the primary means to 
engage in nation-to-nation relations is through the treaty-making process.  
Following from the contemporaneous Cherokee Nation v. Georgia case, 
which recognized Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” Worcester 
described the relationship between the federal government and tribes as a 
form as trust arrangement, analogous in some ways to that of a guardian to 
its ward. Deloria explains that the recognition of a degree of independence 
by the stronger to the weaker is implicit in the trust relationship.  
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Even during that first third of the 19th century, when Chief Justice 
Marshall was elucidating the Supreme Court’s deferential tribal sovereignty 
posture in Worcester, the other branches of the federal government took a 
radically different approach. In the executive branch, President Andrew 
Jackson was an unmitigated disaster for the tribes, with his views that 
Indians’ choices were either to assimilate and be subjected to state authority 
or to move west beyond the Mississippi River. What resulted, among other 
travesties, was the Trail of Tears where over 5,000 Cherokees died on the 
way west, with endless suffering along the way.  
In response to Worcester, Jackson reportedly said, “John Marshall made 
his decision, now let him enforce it.” Jackson disagreed with President 
George Washington’s early assertion that the proper manner of dealing with 
tribes was through the treaty process, stating instead that “the proper 
guardian is the legislature of the Union.” In this declaration were the seeds 
of the doctrine that survives to this day; that is, that Congress has plenary 
power over tribes.  
Well, how does Congress assert its power over Indian tribes? Congress 
asserts its power under the reasoning that the Commerce Clause allows 
Congress to exercise its authority. The Commerce Clause says Congress has 
the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several states, and with the Indian tribes.” So Congress has the power to 
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. Note the implicit recognition in 
the Commerce Clause by the Constitution’s framers that Indian tribes are 
themselves separate, sovereign nations: Congress has the power to regulate 
commerce not only among the states, but also with other separate sovereign 
entities, specifically foreign states and Indian tribes. 
What happened over time, however, is that the U.S. Supreme Court (and 
Congress itself) broadly interpreted the Commerce Clause to dramatically 
expand Congress’s power to not only control commerce with the Indian 
tribes but to control the commerce of the tribes. This effectively gave 
Congress the power to dominate and to control Indian tribes, not just merely 
to regulate commerce of the United States, as the text would suggest, but 
rather to control outright all aspects of the Indian tribes. This approach was 
reflected in the Court’s 1886 United States v. Kagama decision, in which 
the Court endorsed the idea that Congress’s Commerce Clause power gives 
it virtually unlimited plenary guardianship authority over Indian people and 
tribes. Ignoring Marshall’s earlier international law analysis regarding the 
sovereignty of domestic dependent nations, the Court reasoned, “Indian 
tribes are the wards of the nation; they are communities dependent on the 
United States; dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for their 
political rights.” It follows, the Court reasoned, that “[f]rom their very 
weakness and helplessness, largely due to the course of dealings of the 
federal government with them, and the treaties in which it had been 
promised, there arises the duty of protection and with it the power of 
Congress.” 
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Congress’s power was then held to extend to reneging on promises that 
had been made in earlier treaty obligations. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock in 
1903, the Court held that Congress had always had the unilateral power to 
abrogate treaty obligations, an assertion Deloria characterizes as “fraudulent 
on its face.” Phrasing the holding as necessary for Indians’ own care and 
protection, the Court reasoned that to require Congress always to obtain 
Indians’ consent to take land, for example, would deprive it, “in a possible 
emergency when the necessity might be urgent for a partition and disposal 
of the tribal lands, of all power to act, if the assent of the Indians could not 
be obtained.” 
Congress’s guiding principles, Deloria explains, were “considerations of 
justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant 
and dependent race . . . . It was not only a shock but a breach of common 
decency when Congress decided it had absolute power over the once-
powerful tribes,” Deloria fumes. “When the Supreme Court also decided 
that such should be the policy in Lone Wolf, the silent conquest of 
unsuspecting tribes was complete. That decision slammed the door on the 
question of morality and justice. It was like appointing a fox to guard the 
chicken coop.” 
Lone Wolf’s outrageous effect was that “Indians had no chance 
whatsoever to acquire title or rights to land which had been theirs for 
centuries.” Deloria further argues that Indian tribes never would have so 
willingly sacrificed their sovereignty, at least not without a struggle. He 
says,  
[f]ew tribes would have signed treaties with the United States had they felt 
that the U.S. would violate them. The promises of self-government found 
in a multitude of treaties, the promises of protection by the U.S. from 
wrongs committed by its citizens, the promises that the tribes would be 
respected as nations on whose behalf the U.S. acted as trustee before the 
eyes of the world, were all vital parts of the treaty rights which Indians 
believe they have received from the U.S.  
Under longstanding international law principles, Deloria further explains, 
the fact that Indian tribes elected to become dependent upon the U.S. for 
some purposes in no way diminishes their sovereignty and rights of self-
determination. “Indian tribes still have the right to be recognized among the 
nations of earth, even with domestic legal doctrines of the U.S. guaranteeing 
the validity of their titles as held under protected status by the U.S. against 
European nations.” 
III. INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
So how does the issue of Indian Sovereignty play out in terms of human 
rights? Asked another way, to the extent that the Indian nations are part of 
the polity in the United States, does the Constitution—which protects 
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certain human rights—apply to Indian nations? This is an open question that 
Congress tried to settle in 1968. As Matthew Fletcher writes, “Congress 
codified the unsettled tension between American civil rights law and 
American Indian tribal law, customs, and traditions in the American Indian 
communities, by enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act, the ICRA.” ICRA, in 
which “Congress chose to impose a modified form of the Bill of Rights on 
Indian governments in order to protect those under tribal jurisdiction,” was 
enacted out of the concern that Indian “individual rights were receiving 
short shrift in tribal courts and by tribal governments.” As it had done 
previously in other statutes (such as the Indian Reorganization Act), 
Congress “affirmatively sought to displace tribal law and all the attendant 
customs and traditions, as well as Indian values, with American law. 
Ironically, after the Supreme Court interpreted ICRA in 1978, this law could 
only be interpreted and enforced by tribal courts.” This, at least, is 
acknowledgement of tribal sovereignty in the sense that courts and 
Congress were recognizing the authority of tribal courts to decide cases.  
“Tribal law and American civil rights law have been at odds in many 
tribal communities ever since,” Fletcher concludes, “as tribal voters, 
legislatures and courts have struggled with how and whether to apply 
American civil rights law in Indian country.” Deloria suggests ICRA is a 
mixed bag: “In practice, ICRA radically changed the substance of tribal 
courts,” forcing them to decide disputes in ways that newly “restricted the 
powers of Indian tribes with respect to their own membership.” On the 
positive side, “it more clearly defined appeal procedures from tribal court to 
federal court,” and it lessened the problem of other laws which had ceded 
tremendous authority to states to regulate Indian affairs. Cohen’s Handbook, 
which is the authoritative source on federal Indian law, observes that ICRA 
has been an equal-opportunity target of criticism from both those “who 
believe it went too far, and those who believe it did not go far enough in 
constraining tribal actions.”  
“Although ICRA was understood by most people as a major step toward 
the fulfillment of Indian self-government,” Deloria wondered whether it 
“was . . . what Indians really wanted.” Especially after such events as the 
Indian takeover of Alcatraz and Wounded Knee in the 1970s, “when we 
compare a sacred pipe, traditional, and tribal court, modern, as two 
competing means of reconciliation and problem-solving, the two sides in the 
conflict become readily apparent.” 
Again, first principles beg the question of whether Congress even has the 
authority to enact such legislation as ICRA over sovereign, albeit 
dependent, Indian nations. Deloria notes the irony of a statute that would 
“confer upon the American Indians the fundamental Constitutional rights 
which belong by right to all Americans, when by its express terms, the 
Constitution does not apply to the American Indians and their tribal 
relations and does not protect Indian tribes.” 
So, in terms of resisting Congress (again from Matthew Fletcher):  
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A key unanswered question is whether tribal decision-makers must comply 
with the Indian Civil Rights Act at all. As a normative matter, perhaps 
Indian nations should comply with the Congressional mandate, and most 
tribes have agreed to do so. However, at least one tribal court has 
explicitly kept the question open, and it is a valid question, given the 
American Constitution’s ambiguous grant of authority to Congress over 
Indian affairs. Moreover, the fact that ICRA now means that—at least in 
civil cases—only tribal forums are available to interpret and enforce the 
substantive provisions in the statute. 
What if the tribal court, or tribal legislature, actively resists applying, 
interpreting and enforcing ICRA? What if the tribal court holds that 
Congress had no real authority to enact ICRA?  
Currently these questions are more or less irrelevant for two reasons. First, 
few if any tribes overtly resist the substantive rules that ICRA requires. 
Additionally, ICRA largely is redundant in many tribal communities. 
Tribal constitutional and statutory law, not to forget tribal common law, 
already mirror and even expand upon ICRA’s due process and equal 
protection rules, generating rules equivalent to the protections offered in 
federal and state courts. Many tribal courts invoke “fundamental fairness” 
in deciding claims. And just as in federal and state courts the rules may be 
the same, but the protections offered individuals case by case may differ.  
Second, since tribal decision makers can interpret rules required by ICRA 
and the courts with tribal law, customs and traditions [after 1978], ICRA 
itself borders on irrelevance as a substantive matter, while still retaining 
important symbolic meaning. As free speech cases demonstrate, tribal 
decision makers are free to directly apply federal and state law, apply 
modified versions of federal and state law, or even disregard federal and 
state law in favor of tribal common law.  
That said, there are certain flashpoints where tribal law and ICRA may 
collide . . . . Assuming that ICRA protections could not be massaged by a 
tribal court to avoid serious conflict, the tribal decision maker (likely a 
tribal court) may simply assert that Congress had no authority to impose 
federal constitutional rules on internal tribal matters and utterly reject 
ICRA. There are claims perhaps not yet considered that may pit tribal law 
even more directly against ICRA and federal and state civil rights norms, 
potentially placing a tribal court in this position.  
IV. COMMUNITY 
One of the big differences in tribal and Native American culture and 
white culture, or dominant culture if you will, is the emphasis on 
community. A very important point to understand in discussing human 
rights in a native context is that there is an all-encompassing emphasis on 
community in native traditions. The Indian, Harvey Cox suggested in the 
book Secular City, “does not so much live in a tribe; the tribe lives in him. 
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He is the tribe’s subjective expressions.” It follows that “it is virtually 
impossible to ‘join’ a tribal religion by agreeing to its doctrines. People 
couldn’t care less whether an outsider believes in anything.”  
Deloria explains that  
[n]o separate religious standard of behavior is imposed on followers of the 
religious tradition outside of the requirements for the ceremony: who 
should do what, who is excluded, who is needed for other parts of the 
ceremony. The customs of the tribe and the religious responsibilities to the 
group, are practically identical.  
The fact that tribal focus is on community is not to say that the individual is 
completely subsumed. “The fears that some express,” Deloria says,  
as to the lack of personal self among tribal people is unwarranted. For 
example, one of the most notable features of Indian tribal cultures is the 
custom of naming individuals. Indian names stand for certain qualities, for 
exploits, for unusual abilities, unique physical characteristics, and for the 
individual’s unusual religious experiences. Every person has a name, given 
in religious ceremonies, in which his uniqueness is recognized; 
in contrast to the largely generic names given in dominant culture. 
“Individual worth was also recognized in other ways in tribal religions,” 
Deloria continues.  
The keepers of the sacred medicine bundles, for example, were people 
who had been carefully watched for their personal characteristics, and 
were chosen to share some of the tribal mysteries and responsibilities in a 
religious sense. The priesthoods of some of the tribes were filled with 
people who had been carefully trained after they had demonstrated their 
personal integrity. In almost every way, tribal religions supported the 
individual in his or her community context. 
Tribal traditions of spirituality inform customary tribal approaches in the 
area of governance and law as well. Deloria says that “laws as such did not 
exist in tribal societies. Law was rejected as being force imposed from 
without, whereas peoplehood required fulfillment from within the 
individual. Insofar as there were external controls, Indians accepted only the 
traditions and customs which were rooted in the tribe’s distant past.” Most 
tribes had never defined power in authoritarian terms. Deloria explains:  
A man consistently successful at war or hunting was likely to attract a 
following in direct proportion to his continuing successes. Eventually, the 
man with the greatest followings composed an informal council which 
made important decisions for the group. Anyone was free to follow or not, 
depending upon his own best judgment. The people only followed a course 
of action if they were convinced it was best for them. This was as close as 
most tribes ever got to a formal government. 
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Further on the point of individual versus group rights, Fletcher adds,  
Tribal law prior to the Indian Civil Rights Act, generally speaking, was 
much more oriented towards the rights of the group, over the rights of the 
individual . . . . The kind of coercive, arbitrary and violent government 
actions generated by Euro-American governments—that is, imprisonment, 
execution, police brutality, denial of governmental benefits and services, 
eminent domain, interrogation, entrapment, surveillance, quartering of 
soldiers and so on—were rarely if ever perpetuated by Indian 
communities. A classic Supreme Court case analyzing the dark side of 
Anglo-American law is Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Court concluded 
that the long history and custom of police abuses of suspected criminals 
required a Constitution-based prophylactic rule prohibiting the 
interrogation of suspects, unless they were aware of their rights to silence 
and counsel. As the Navajo nation’s Supreme Court recently noted, there 
is no such tradition of law enforcement at Navajo, and likely no such 
tradition in the vast majority of American Indian communities.  
One area that we can look at in terms of how ICRA may differ among 
Indian tribes, and the protection of human rights as such, is the protection of 
speech. The Indian Bill of Rights incorporates aspects of the First 
Amendment, prohibiting Indian tribes that exercise powers of self-
government from making or enforcing any law preventing the free exercise 
of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech or the press, or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances. 
So “the freedom of speech (and of the press) is uniquely linked to 
participation of individuals in government and politics,” Fletcher explains.  
In the American constitutional structure, these political rights help to form 
the core of American governance and liberty . . . . In American Indian 
politics the right to speak also is a core aspect of government, but in ways 
that sometimes differ from American politics. In general, tribal 
communities have always presumed the right to speech, whereas speech in 
American politics is a new creature, subject to continued and varied 
restrictions, in spite of the First Amendment. “Leaders are inherently 
powerless to deprive any family of its means of subsistence. As long as 
each family stays within its ancestral lands, and retains its economic 
autonomy, the right to dissent is a practical reality.” 
We may conclude, as Fletcher asserts, that “tribal law develops daily, 
and since federal courts generally, since 1978, no longer hear civil rights 
claims being brought under the ICRA, it is appropriate to focus on modern 
tribal law relating to free speech.” Regarding speech, many tribal 
constitutions give free speech rights, some do not. And indeed, some of the 
tribal constitutions give more rights, in the sense that they are not limited 
only to “state action” (i.e., government action), but also prohibit 
abridgement of free speech rights by private individuals. And, “where no 
tribal custom or tradition has been argued or implicated, [tribal courts] will 
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look to general U.S. constitutional principles, as articulated by federal and 
[state] courts, for guidance.”  
Fletcher concludes: 
Tribal courts have no obligation to apply federal and state constitutional 
law as it relates to free speech. Sometime tribal courts will apply strict, 
intermediate or rational basis scrutiny to analyze government restrictions 
on speech in relevant contexts, while others do not. Some courts rely 
heavily on tribal customary or traditional law, while others rely less. 
However, depending on the strength or intensity of the customary or 
traditional interest in free speech restriction, tribal courts are more likely to 
invoke tribal, customary, or traditional law. If a legal dispute involving a 
uniquely tribal practice, tradition, art or custom arises, it is far more likely 
(and reasonable, if not desirable) for a tribal court to apply traditional or 
customary law. 
 

